Saturday | April 5, 2025
Clad in brown uniforms, Chinese military officials spread out among rows of young saplings, shoveling soil into freshly dug holes. As the camera sweeps across the scene, it lingers on the top brass, capturing them in order of rank. Yet one notable figure is missing.
The news segment, broadcast Wednesday night by China’s state television, covered an annual tree-planting event on the outskirts of Beijing—a spring tradition among military leaders for over 40 years. But conspicuously absent was General He Weidong, the People’s Liberation Army’s second-highest-ranking officer. His name was also missing from the official state news agency’s coverage of the event.
His absence has sparked renewed speculation that he may be the latest—and highest-ranking—victim of President Xi Jinping’s sweeping purge of the military’s upper echelons.
Gen. He, vice chairman of the influential Central Military Commission (CMC), has shared a longstanding relationship with Xi dating back to their early careers in Fujian province. Yet rumors of an investigation into his conduct began circulating among dissidents last month, following China’s annual political meetings.
He, 67, has not been seen in public since the March 11 closing ceremony of the National People’s Congress. The government has done little to dispel the mystery. When questioned about his whereabouts on March 27, Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian simply said: “There is no information on this matter, and we are not aware of the situation.”
He’s disappearance raises more questions than answers. Though it’s not unusual for top generals without public roles to vanish temporarily, his absence from a carefully choreographed propaganda event is striking—especially in a political system that relies heavily on symbolism and appearances.
“The absence of a CMC vice chair is clearly significant,” said James Char, a PLA expert and assistant professor at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Like the Communist Party Congress and the annual “two sessions” meetings, events like this are intended to project strength—and unity. “It’s important for all key figures to be seen together,” Char noted, “because it reinforces the image of a unified and powerful party.”
Reading the “tree leaves”
In the opaque world of Chinese politics, where transparency is scarce and decisions are often made behind closed doors, analysts have long relied on subtle signals rooted in Communist Party protocol and tradition to gauge what’s really happening. This practice—often likened to “tea-leaf reading”—has become even more crucial under Xi Jinping, as he consolidates power and renders the political landscape increasingly inscrutable.
Now, experts are once again parsing symbolic cues for insight into the fate of one of Xi’s most senior generals.
This week’s tree-planting ceremony—an annual event steeped in tradition—has taken on outsized significance. The ritual traces its roots back to 1981, when then-leader Deng Xiaoping launched a nationwide afforestation campaign in response to devastating floods he attributed to widespread deforestation. Promoted as a patriotic duty to “green the motherland, build socialism, and benefit future generations,” the campaign was inaugurated by Deng himself, who planted the first tree as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Since then, the CMC’s top leadership has participated in the tree-planting ceremony every spring. According to state news agency Xinhua, Wednesday marked the 43rd consecutive year of collective participation by CMC leaders in the capital. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012, both of his vice chairmen have attended the event without fail—until this year.
Conspicuously absent was Gen. He Weidong, Xi’s second-in-command on the CMC. His no-show came alongside that of only one other uniformed CMC member, Adm. Miao Hua—who is already under investigation for “serious violations of discipline,” a familiar euphemism for corruption or political disloyalty.
In contrast, the first-ranking vice chairman, Gen. Zhang Youxia, attended the ceremony, along with other senior officers including Liu Zhenli and Zhang Shengmin. Also present was Defense Minister Dong Jun, who was previously rumored to be under investigation but reappeared in public within a week—underscoring that disappearances from the spotlight don’t always spell doom.
Still, He’s unexplained absence has raised eyebrows. “I think He’s absence is quite telling,” said James Char, a PLA expert at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. “But again, no one can be absolutely sure.”
Some analysts suggest there may be a more benign explanation. One theory is that Gen. He has been involved in the recent military exercises conducted around Taiwan. Beginning Tuesday, the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command launched two days of surprise drills simulating a blockade of Taiwan, with mock strikes on ports, infrastructure, and long-range targets. These operations are especially significant because Gen. He previously commanded the Eastern Theater Command from 2019 to 2022—a period marked by heightened tensions, including the massive show of force following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taipei.
In China, vanishing from public view doesn’t always indicate wrongdoing. Some officials are temporarily sidelined for questioning, sometimes as witnesses in broader corruption probes, and later return to their roles. Still, in a system where appearances are everything, skipping a high-profile, carefully stage-managed event like the CMC tree-planting can be a powerful signal.
Military purges
After rising to power, Xi Jinping swiftly consolidated his grip over the world’s largest military by removing influential generals from rival factions and replacing them with trusted allies and loyal protégés. Yet more than a decade later—despite a sweeping overhaul of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a leadership stacked with his own appointees—Xi remains entangled in an unrelenting campaign against corruption and perceived disloyalty, which increasingly targets even his handpicked insiders.
Since mid-2023, over a dozen senior figures within China’s defense establishment have been purged, including two defense ministers elevated to the Central Military Commission (CMC) by Xi himself. The crackdown has largely focused on the PLA’s nuclear forces and weapons procurement systems—critical sectors tied directly to national defense.
This ongoing upheaval has raised concerns about Xi’s ability to stamp out entrenched graft and boost the PLA’s combat readiness amid growing geopolitical tensions.
“Recurring purges of the senior-most PLA leaders indicate that Xi Jinping distrusts his officer corps,” said Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). “The constant removal of so many senior officers, as well as the extent of corruption reaching the very top, undoubtedly affects the PLA’s morale—and likely its operational capabilities.”
Still, some analysts argue that the PLA has grown used to the turbulence. What was once shocking is now routine.
“Leadership purges in the PLA seem to have become normalized to a point where it’s just part and parcel of being in the military,” said Collin Koh, another research fellow at RSIS. According to Koh, the PLA may now be able to compartmentalize the political shake-ups—keeping them separate from day-to-day operations.
“The purges don’t necessarily mean the PLA is compromising on readiness,” he added. “In fact, they might serve as a sharp reminder: if you want to survive in this environment, the best strategy is to follow the party’s orders—and that means being prepared for conflict.”
A close confidant
Like Adm. Miao Hua, Gen. He Weidong is widely believed to have forged close personal ties with Xi Jinping during their overlapping years in Fujian, where Xi was climbing the ranks as a local official in the 1990s and early 2000s. Both men spent the formative years of their military careers in the former 31st Group Army, headquartered in the province—a unit that would later become a key power base for Xi.
Since Xi took the helm of the Communist Party in 2012, a string of officers with ties to the 31st Group Army have been swiftly promoted. Gen. He was among the most prominent. In 2013, he became commander of the Jiangsu Military District. Less than a year later, he was tapped to lead the Shanghai Garrison. By 2016, he had been appointed commander of ground forces in the Western Theater Command, responsible for China’s contested border with India.
His ascent continued rapidly. In 2017, He was promoted to full general and named commander of the Eastern Theater Command—tasked with overseeing any potential military action against Taiwan, including blockades and invasions.
But the clearest sign of Xi’s trust came in 2022, when He was elevated to vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the 20th Party Congress. It was a remarkable leap for someone who hadn’t previously served on the Communist Party’s Central Committee—a sign of exceptional favor. That reshuffle saw Xi surround himself with six loyalists on the CMC, consolidating his control over the military like never before.
If He is indeed under investigation, he would be the first sitting CMC vice chairman to fall in Xi’s sweeping anti-corruption drive, and the third current member of the powerful military body to be purged. The last time a serving vice chair was ousted came more than three decades ago, during the political fallout from the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, when then-Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was removed for sympathizing with the demonstrators.
“What ultimately happens to He Weidong will offer a window into how China’s political system is being further reshaped under Xi,” said James Char, the PLA expert at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. “No one in the system now is irreplaceable,” he added. “This is what a political strongman does—he’s ruthless, and he’s constantly purging his own ranks to keep his generals on edge.”